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This article discusses various measures of the damages of a private 
plaintiff who sues a stock market insider trading defendant. The measures are: 
"pure" out of pocket, "expedient" out of pocket, rescissory, and cover. 
The "pure" out of pocket measure is the difference between the 
transaction price and the real or actual share value. Implicitly, this measure 
assumes that but-for the defendant's fraud, the plaintiff would have traded at 
the same time anyway, but at a better price. 
The so-called "expedient" out of pocket measure accepts the "pure" 
out of pocket measure in principle. Nevertheless, to avoid the practical 
difficulty of determining the real value of the stock at the time of the 
plaintiffs trade, the "expedient" out of pocket measure substitutes for this 
"true value" the market price after dissemination of the correct or previously 
nonpublic information. A variant of the "expedient" out of pocket measure 
looks to either the dollar or percentage price change at curative dissemination 
and uses this change as a measure of the damages to the plaintiff. The price 
change at dissemination could be applied to the plaintiff s transaction price to 
estimate the true value at the time of the plaintiff s trade. More complex 
variations exist to correct for the effects of extraneous factors. 
The rescissory measure attempts to undo the fraudulent transaction and 
return the defrauded party to her position before the fraudulent inducement 
caused her to enter into the trade. In other words, rescissory damages award a 
plaintiff the dollar amount at the time of judgment necessary to put her back in 
her original position prior to the fraudulent transaction. This measure 
implicitly assumes that the plaintiff would not have traded but-for the 
defendant's fraud. 
For the rescissory measure, courts usually require the plaintiff to prove 
a contractual relationship with the defendant. Most stock market insider 
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trading plaintiffs are not in contractual privity with the defendant. The 
rescissory measure would give such plaintiffs an unjustified "free ride" to gain 
speculative profits from stock price changes until the date of judgment 
without risking any money. Nevertheless, rescissory damages might 
conceivably be available to a plaintiff in contractual privity with an insider 
trading defendant, especially one liable under the classical relationship theory. 
Like the rescissory measure, the cover measure implicitly presumes 
that the plaintiff would not have traded but-for the defendant's fraud. This 
approach also implicitly assumes that the plaintiff is entitled to a rescissory 
measure of damages. Nevertheless, the cover measure imposes on the plaintiff 
the obligation to mitigate damages by reversing her trade within a 
"reasonable" time after curative disclosure. 
Although this article briefly discusses two additional damage 
measures, "disgorgement of windfall profits" and "benefit of the bargain," 
these two measures are not appropriate in stock market insider trading cases. 
To select a "fair" measure of damages, one must know what the 
plaintiff would have done absent the defendant's fraud. When the plaintiff 
bought or sold a publicly traded security, she had an almost infinite number of 
alternatives. If the plaintiff would have traded at the same time anyway, but at 
a different price, the "pure" out of pocket or "expedient" out of pocket 
measures would be appropriate. If the plaintiff would not have traded and 
would have maintained that position until the time of judgment, the rescissory 
measure might be proper; but fairness might require the plaintiff to mitigate 
damages, in which case the cover measure would be appropriate. 
Knowing what the plaintiff would have done is difficult because any 
plaintiff testimony may be self-serving. With class actions, the members of 
the plaintiff class are not even available to give self-serving testimony and, in 
any event, are not uniform and would have pursued different courses of action 
absent the fraud. Therefore, no one measure of damages is "fair." 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the measure of damages of a private plaintiff 
who sues a stock market insider trading defendant. This piece does not cover 
the size of the class of plaintiffs who can sue such a defendant. 1 In fact, 
defendants can be liable to "contemporaneous traders,,,2 a class that may be 
large.3 
Because of the possibly large number of plaintiffs, if each member of 
that class could recover actual damages, however measured, the aggregate 
liability of the defendant could be enormous. In reality, however, the ceiling 
on the defendant's liability to contemporaneous traders in an express4 or 
implied cause of actionS is the insider trading profit. Therefore, the pro rata 
recovery of each plaintiff may be minuscule. 6 If so, the measure of actual 
damages for each plaintiff may make little difference because each plaintiff 
receives such a tiny percentage of that damage, however measured. 
Nevertheless, a court must still determine each plaintiffs actual damages 
before awarding a fraction of it. 
Furthermore, the party on the other side of the insider trade may 
conceivably have an implied action for actual damages against a defendant 
liable under the classical relationship theory. 7 If so, that plaintiff may be able 
to recover all her actual damages. 8 These damages would have to be 
measured. Part I below discusses various possible approaches. 
1. V ARIOUS MEASURES OF ACTUAL DAMAGES 
The following are various measures of damages in section 1 O(b) suits 
generally: out of pocket,9 "expedient" out of pocket,lO rescissory,l1 cover, 12 
1 For discussion of the class of plaintiffs, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, 
INSIDER TRADING (2d ed. 2008), ch. 6. 
2 See id §§ 6:2, 6:3, 6:4, 6:10.1, 6:11. 
3 See id §§ 6:4, 6: II. 
4 See id §§ 4:8.3[A], 6:2. For related discussion of this ceiling on damages, see irifra note 36. 
5 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4:8.3[B], 6:3; irifra notes 64-65 and 
accompanying text. 
6 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 6:3 n.62-63 and accompanying text. 
7 See id § 6:8. 
8 See id Such a plaintiff may have the alternate remedy of rescission. See id § 4:9. 
9 See infra Part LA. 
10 See infra Part LB. 
11 See infra Part I.C. 
12 See infra Part I.D. 
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disgorgement of windfall profits,13 and benefit of the bargain. 14 Some of these 
might be appropriate in insider trading cases; others are not. IS 
The Supreme Court held in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States I6 
that section 28(a) of the Exchange Act provides the "correct measure of 
damages" in securities fraud cases. 17 Section 28(a)IS permits the recovery of 
"actual damages,,,19 but Affiliated Ute did not define the term.20 The courts 
generally agree that section 28(a) allows the recovery of only compensatory, 
not punitive damages,21 and that it prevents double recovery by those who 
13 See infra Part I.F. 
14 See infra Part I.G. 
15 For a discussion of the measure of Rule lOb-5 damages in general and in insider trading 
cases, see William E. Aliken, Jr., Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damages 
Recoverable from Insider in Private Civil Action for Violation of § 1O(b) of Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC § 78j(b)) or SEC Rule 10b-5, 29 A.L.R. FED. 646. For a 
general discussion of Rule 10b-5 damages, see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, 
Compensatory Damages in Rule 1Ob-5 Actions: Pragmatic Justice or Chaos, 30 SETON HALL 
L. REv. 1083 (2000); Stephen P. Younger, Damages in Securities Litigation, 37 REv. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 19, 19-20 (Feb. 11, 2004). See generally Baruch Lev & Meiring de 
Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and Rule 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy 
Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REv. 7 (1994); Steven B. Rosenfeld, Pleading Damage Claims for 
Insider Trading, 27 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 91 (1994); A. Robert Thorup, Theories 
of Damages: Allowability and Calculation in Securities Fraud Litigation, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 
23 (1990). 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, enacted certain 
provisions dealing with joint and several liability, proportionate fault, and settlement 
judgment reductions. For discussion of these provisions, see Amy J. St. Eve & Bryce C. Pilz, 
The Fault Allocation Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-A 
Roadmap for Litigants and Courts, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 187 (2006). 
This Article does not discuss how to calculate the damages of a plaintiff who bought and 
sold numerous times during the period of fraud by the defendant. For discussion of this 
question, see Samuel Francis, Note, Meet Two-Face: The Dualistic Rule 10b-5 and the 
Quandry of Offsetting Losses by Gains, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 3045 (2009). 
16 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). 
17 Id. For discussion of Affiliated Ute Citizens' treatment of damages, see Lowenfels & 
Bromberg, supra note 15, at 1087-89. 
18 Section 28(a) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for 
damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment 
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act 
complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2009). 
19 Id. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-91 (1983), held that in a private 
civil suit for money damages under § 1O(b) and Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff must prove his or her 
case by a preponderance of the evidence. 
20 See Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 155. 
21 See Grogan v. Garner, 806 F.2d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 1986); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 
111 (2d Cir. 1981) (dictum); Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303,1313 
(2d Cir. 1977); Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 
1976); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,259-60 (4th Cir. 1975); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 
291,302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 
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assert both state and federal claims which arise out of the same conduct. 22 
Beyond these points, however, the courts diverge in their interpretation of the 
proper measure of damages?3 
A. "Pure" Out of Pocket 
The phrase "pure" out of pocket measure is a term invented by the 
author of this article. For section 1 O(b )lRule lOb-5, the "pure" out of pocket 
measure is the traditional measure of damages?4 This is the difference 
748 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Aliken, supra note 15, § 20 (citing 
numerous cases). 
22 See, e.g., Osoftky, 645 F.2d at Ill. 
23 See Younger, supra note 15, at 19 ("There is a large degree of uncertainty in the law as to 
the proper method for calculating damages for the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws."); cf Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud 
Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REv. 348, 349 (2007) ("[N]o coherent doctrinal statement exists for 
calculating open-market damages in Rule lOb-5 securities fraud class actions."). 
24 See Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Astor 
Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Rumfield Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1551 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(stating "the statutes limit victims to 'actual damage', which the courts routinely understand 
to mean 'out of pocket loss'" (citations omitted)); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc. 863 F.2d 
1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982) 
(stating "[t]he customary measure of damages in a Rule lOb-5 case is the out-of-pocket loss"); 
Glick v. Compagna, 613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The traditional measure of damages is 
the difference between the fair value of what the seller receives for his stock and what he 
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct." (dictum)); Madigan, Inc. v. 
Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir. 1974); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 928 F. 
Supp. 557, 565 (W.D. Pa. 1996); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); Janet C. Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 
STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1490-91 (1996) [hereinafter Rethinking]; Janet C. Alexander, The Value 
of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1421, 1428 (1994) [hereinafter 
Bad News]; Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 829, 839 (2006) (stating that "standard measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases is 
'out of pocket"'); id. at 845,863,870 & n.118 (same); Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of 
Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REv. 
349,356 (1984) [hereinafter Restitution]; Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The Implications of 
Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 435, 446 (1997); 
Younger, supra note 15, at 19-20 ("Most courts have adopted the out-of-pocket rule as the 
basic measure of damages in Rule lOb-5 actions, and it remains the dominant theory." 
(footnote omitted)); see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) ("Courts have 
also generally applied this 'out of pocket' measure of damages in § 10(b) cases involving 
fraud by a seller of securities .... "); Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporation Law: Torts 
and Fiduciary Duty, 31 J. CORP. L. 877, 886 (2006) ("The usual measure of recovery for 
common law fraud and securities fraud has been out of pocket damages .... ") [hereinafter 
Torts]; cf Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 155 ("In our view, the correct measure of 
damages under § 28 of the Act ... is the difference between the fair value of all that the ... 
[plaintiff] received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no 
fraudulent conduct, ... except for the situation where the defendant received more than the 
6 UC Davis Business Law Journal [Vol. 10 
between the transaction price and the real or actual value.25 Implicitly, this 
seller's actual loss."). But see Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,441-42 (7th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988) (stating in dictum that there are two standard 
measures of damages in securities law: one based on defendant's gain and one based on 
plaintiff' s loss). 
25 See Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n.5 (lIth Cir. 1997) (stating, 
"the difference between the price paid and the 'real' value of the security" (quoting 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,556 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev 'd 
in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983))); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 
F.2d l335, l344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part) 
("[D]ifference between the purchase price and the value of the stock at the date of 
purchase."); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc., 303 F.2d at 533 (stating, "the difference between 
the contract price, or the price paid, and the real or actual value at the date of the sale"); 
Hudson Venture Partners, L.P. v. Patriot Aviation Group, Inc., [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\I 91,448, at 96,682, 96,683 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing other cases); In re 
Mutual Sav. Bank Sec. Litig., 166 F.R.D. 377, 383 n.10 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Robert B. 
Thompson, "Simplicity and Certainty" in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule IOb-5, 51 
Bus. LAW. 1177, 1181 (1996) [hereinafter Simplicity]; Restitution, supra note 24, at 356-68; 
Scudder, supra note 24, at 446; Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act and the States: Who Will Decide the Future of Securities Litigation, 46 
EMORYL.J. 1237, 1251 (1997); Younger, supra note 15, at 20; cf Randall, 478 U.S. at 661-
62 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 155) ("[T]he difference between the fair value 
of all that the [plaintifi] received and the fair value of what he would have received had there 
been no fraudulent conduct."); Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc., 105 F.3d 745,757-58 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (applying Affiliated Ute Citizens' language to measure out of pocket damages in 
close corporation context), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997). For a slightly different 
defmition, see Peri Nielsen & Stephen Prowse, Dura's Impact on Damages, 22 INSIGHTS, July 
2008, at 16 ("[D]ifference between the actual paid price for a stock and its 'true value' at the 
date of purchase less the difference between the actual price of the stock and its 'true value' at 
the date of sale."). 
Randall also noted that "there is authority for allowing the § 1 O(b) plaintiff, at least in 
some circumstances, to choose between 'undoing the bargain ... or ... [out of pocket] 
damages." 478 U.S. at 662 (quoting LOUIS Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1133 (1983)) (brackets in original). 
California Corporations Code § 25502 codifies the "pure" out of pocket measure of 
damages: 
Any person who violates Section 25402 shall be liable to the person who 
purchases a security from him or sells a security to him, for damages equal 
to the difference between the price at which such security was purchased or 
sold and the market value which such security would have had at the time 
of the purchase or sale if the information known to the defendant had been 
publicly disseminated prior to that time and a reasonable time had elapsed 
for the market to absorb the information, plus interest at the legal rate .... 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502 (2009). 
For a discussion of the out of pocket measure generally and its application to insider 
trading cases, see Aliken, supra note 15, Part I. For a discussion of the out of pocket measure 
in issuer misrepresentation cases, see William O. Fisher, The Analyst-Added Premium as a 
Defense in Open Market Securities Cases, 53 Bus. LAW. 35, 53-54 (1997). For additional 
discussion of the out of pocket measure, see Scott M. Himes, Measuring Damages for Fraud-
Based Mismanagement of a Securities Portfolio, 27 SEC. REG. LJ. 74, 78-80 (1999); 
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measure assumes that but-for the defendant's fraud, the plaintiff would have 
traded at the same time anyway but at a better price. 
This approach has the merit of limiting recovery to the plaintiff s 
actual loss, thereby eliminating any potential speculative gain. 26 The 
measure's principal disadvantage may be the difficulty of establishing actual 
value at the time ofthe plaintiff s trade?7 
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 15, at 1087, 1093-96 (discussing Affiliated Ute Citizens 
and Ansin); Younger, supra note 15, at 19-21. For discussion of the out of pocket measure of 
damages under New York law, see Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs. LLC v. Rpost Int'l 
Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 2d 428,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
Before a plaintiff is entitled to damages, however, she must demonstrate loss causation. 
For discussion of the loss causation requirement in civil suits against misappropriators, see 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 6:10.3 & nn.594-47. For additional discussion of "loss 
causation," see Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005); WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, §§ 3:3.6 n.53, 4.1 n.12 and accompanying text, 4.5 n.475 and accompanying 
text, 4.9.1 n.744 and accompanying text; 6:10.3 n.594 and accompanying text; infra notes 26, 
33. 
26 See Younger, supra note 15, at 20 ("[F]ocuses on the plaintiffs actual or 'out-of-pocket' 
loss rather than speculating about any potential gain from the transaction . . . ."); see also 
Madigan Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239-40 (7th Cir. 1974); cf Green v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in result in part) (rejecting rescissory damages and endorsing "pure" out of pocket 
in one particular case); Restitution, supra note 24, at 357-58 (out of pocket measure prevents 
plaintiff from shifting market risk to defendant and precludes benefit of bargain measure). 
If the plaintiff reverses the transaction prior to any price adjustment (due to curative 
disclosure by issuer or others), she would have no recovery. One reason would be the need to 
demonstrate "loss causation." See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342 ("[I]f, say, the purchaser sells the 
shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have 
led to any loss."). Another reason would be because of a limitation on damages. See Fox, 
supra note 24, at 845 ("[T]he plaintiffs recovery in damages would be limited to the extent 
that she receives at the time of sale a benefit arising from the same wrong because of any 
continuing inflation."). In this situation, Professor Fox argues for the damages limitation 
instead of the "loss causation" approach. See id. at 845,863-64. 
Suppose a plaintiff reverses the transaction after curative disclosure at a better price, 
either: (1) buying before curative disclosure and then selling at a higher price after curative 
disclosure, or (2) selling before curative disclosure and then buying at a lower price after 
curative disclosure. 
Dura reserved the question whether the plaintiff could recover in this scenario. See Dura, 
544 U.S. at 343 ("The same is true in respect to a claim that a share's higher price is lower 
than it would otherwise have been-a claim we do not consider here."); Fox, supra note 24, at 
847-48; Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 337, 361-63 (2006). For an argument that a plaintiff 
who pays an inflated price because of the defendant's fraud may be harmed regardless 
whether the plaintiff eventually sells at a price higher or lower than the original price, see id. 
at 362-68. 
27 Cf Restitution, supra note 24, at 362-63 (describing use of price at later date as best 
evidence of what stock was worth at time of plaintiffs transaction). But see Green v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result in part) ("[E]stablishing the required value line [value at the 
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One district court initially adopted the "pure" out of pocket measure of 
damages in an insider trading case.28 Upon reconsideration, however, the 
court used another measure (the "expedient" out of pocket). 29 In the course of 
refusing to dismiss a complaint in an insider trading case, another district 
court judge endorsed the "pure" out of pocket measure in dictum. 30 
Despite the lower federal courts' endorsement of pure out of pocket 
damages, the Supreme Court opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo,31 may cast some doubt on the validity of this damage measure in 
open market transactions. Dura unanimously held that a private Rule 10b-5 
complaint insufficiently alleged loss causation if, without any additional 
elaboration, the complaint stated solely that the plaintiff purchased stock at a 
price artificially inflated by the defendant's misstatements.32 The opinion did 
not clarify what additional elaboration would suffice.33 
date of trades of plaintiff class] is practicable .... "); In re Seagate Technology II Sec. Litig., 
843 F. Supp. l341, l347-50 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing Judge Sneed's approach); but cf 
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating "[t]he fact finder may rely 
on other methods of determining actual value on the date of purchase, including expert 
testimony ... "), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). 
For commentary on the possible use of finance theory to calculate the true value at the 
time of sale and the difficulties involved in that use, see Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert 
Standards in Calculating Damages for Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 Bus. LAW. 
955, 957-59 (2007) (discussing computation of share price inflation using event studies); 
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in 
Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REv. 883 (1990). 
For additional discussion of possible approaches to determining the true value of a stock 
at the time of the plaintiff's trade, see Arthur H. Rosenbloom & Kurt Kroboth, Stock Fraud 
Case Awards? Go Figure, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at B7; Scudder, supra note 24, at 447-
51; infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. For related discussion of "event study" 
methodology, the "value line," and similar approaches, see infra notes 39, 41. 
28 See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 635 
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
29 See id. at l32-33. For discussion of the revised decision, see irifra Parts LB., LD. The 
circuit court opinion summarizes the district court's revised holding. See Elkind v. Liggett & 
Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162, 168 n.25 (2d Cir. 1980). For discussion of the circuit court's 
measure of damages, see infra note 36; infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
30 Froid v. Berner, 649 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (D.N.J. 1986) (nevertheless, court proceeded to 
grant summary judgment to defendants because "[a] rational fact-fmder ... could not fmd that 
defendants possessed any inside information .... " !d. at 1425). 
In at least one case brought by the SEC seeking disgorgement of insider trading profits, 
the settlement plan limited recovery from the disgorgement fund to investors who sustained 
"out-of-pocket losses." See SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of and 
Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe IntI. Corp., 817 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 
1987) (approving this aspect of plan), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1060 (1988). 
31 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
32 See id. at 338-48. 
33 For discussion of the narrowness of Dura and the many issues left unresolved, see Burch, 
supra note 23, at 359-60; Fox, supra note 24; Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 Bus. 
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B. "Expedient" Out of Pocket 
The phrase "expedient" out of pocket measure is a term invented by 
the author of this article. The so-called "expedient" out of pocket measure 
accepts the "pure" out of pocket measure in principle. Nevertheless, to avoid 
the practical difficulty of determining the real value of the stock at the time of 
the plaintiff s trade, the "expedient" out of pocket measure substitutes for this 
"true value" the market price after dissemination of the correct or previously 
nonpublic information.34 
LAW. 1547 (2005); Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-On-The-
Market Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31,41-42,48-
51 (2008); Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 41-48 (2005). For additional 
discussion of Dura, see Jonathan C. Dickey & Daniel Floyd, The Dura Debate: Recent 
Securities Litigation Decisions on Loss Causation, INSIGHTS, April 2007, at 2; Alan Ferrell & 
Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The 
Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 73 Bus. LAW. 163 (2007); Olazabal, 
supra note 26. 
For discussion of Dura's effect on the measurement of damages, see Nielsen & Prowse, 
supra note 25: 
Id at 19. 
Dura has also given defendant experts additional ammunition ... to attack 
"ins-and-outs" damages generated by [certain methods] of measuring [stock 
price] inflation. In addition . . . , the increased focus on linking alleged 
losses to corrective disclosures has focused attention and controversy over 
the way to implement many of the other steps involved in estimating per-
share inflation, including the identification of alleged corrective disclosures, 
the measurement of the stock price movement and its statistical significance 
associated with the alleged corrective disclosures, and the parsing of the 
stock price movement when there is confounding information released 
simultaneously with the alleged corrective disclosures. 
For discussion of Dura's effect on certain price inflation models used to measure out of 
pocket damages and the adjustments to those models required in light of Dura, see David 
Tabak, Inflation and Damages in a Post-Dura World (Sept. 15, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com./abstract=1017334 (working paper). 
For related discussion of "loss causation," see supra notes 25, 26. 
34 See Olazabal, supra note 26, at 360-61 (citing WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARc I. STEINBERG, 
INSIDER TRADING (1st ed. 1996)); Simplicity, supra note 25, at 1181-82 (citing WILLIAM K.S. 
WANG & MARc I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1st ed. 1996)); id at 1191; Restitution, 
supra note 24, at 362 ("The court in some cases simply may accept the subsequent date as 
good evidence of what the stock was worth at the earlier time."); see also Younger, supra 
note 15, at 20 ("A third view ... values the security at a post-transaction date ... such as the 
market reaction to the fraud .... This type of valuation can be described as a hybrid out-of-
pocket measure of damages."). 
The Conference Report on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 described 
as "typical" the "expedient" out of pocket measure. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
The Conference Report, however, then notes a problem with this approach. See infra note 38. 
For an example of a non-insider trading case adopting the expedient out of pocket 
measure, see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (using 
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In an insider trading case, one district court initially adopted the "pure" 
out of pocket measure of damages.35 Upon reconsideration, however, the 
judge used the "expedient" out of pocket measure. 36 
different terms, stating that if plaintiff could not demonstrate "expedient" out of pocket 
damages, he could attempt to demonstrate "pure" out of pocket measure damages. See id. at 
227.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1054 (1976). 
For another non-insider trading case that adopted a variant of the expedient out of pocket 
measure of damages, see In re Home Theater Sec. Litig., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) '\I 99,576, at 97,851, 97,853-54 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The opinion rejected the 
defendant's argument for the stock's market price on the last day of trading on the market 
after disclosure of the adverse news. Instead, the court accepted the plaintiffs' expert's use of 
the average value "for five dates after the stock was delisted from NASDAQ." Id. at 97,583. 
The opinion noted that the defendant had not presented any evidence that the stock's closing 
price on the day after the disclosure accurately reflected the stock's true value. See id. at 97, 
584. 
For an example of a non-insider-trading case that adopted the expedient out of pocket 
measure of damages for buyers who still retained their shares at the time the massive fraud 
was revealed to the market, see In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). The court adjusted the expedient out of pocket measure "to reflect that 
portion of the loss attributed to market and other factors." Id. The court also allowed certain 
plaintiffs consequential damages in connection with their proxy context to gain control of the 
corporation as well as other expenses. See id. at 1166, 1173-74. 
For a general discussion of the use of "reasonable time after public availability of 
accurate information" to measure out of pocket damages, see Aliken, supra note 15, § 14[c]. 
For discussion of a somewhat similar concept called "modified out of pocket" measure, 
see Restitution, supra note 24, at 361-65. Professor Thompson's concept, however, combines 
my term "expedient" out of pocket measure with my concept of the cover measure. See id. at 
363 n.54. Thompson also describes other rationales for modifying the out of pocket measure. 
See id. at 363-65. 
When Congress created a civil penalty for stock market insider trading defendants, 
Congress defmed "profit gained" or "loss avoided" of the defendant as "the difference 
between the purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security as measured 
by the trading price of the security a reasonable time after public dissemination of the 
nonpublic information." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21A(t), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(t) 
(2009). For discussion of the civil penalty provisions of § 21A, see WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 1, § 7:3.3. 
35 See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 635 
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
36 See id. at l32-l33. The circuit court opinion summarizes the district court's revised 
holding. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162, 168 n.25 (2d Cir. 1980). As 
the circuit court notes: "While the district court cited to Mitchell, its opinion makes clear that 
it was applying the out-of-pocket measure of damages." Id. at 168 n.25. Actually, in this 
article's terminology, the district court applied the "expedient" out of pocket measure. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit (1) in the aggregate for all plaintiffs, adopted an overall 
recovery ceiling of the insider trading profit, and (2) apparently adopted the cover measure of 
damages, rather than either the pure or "expedient" out of pocket measures. See Elkind, 635 
F.2d at 172-73; infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act creates an express private action for 
contemporaneous traders suing someone who violates the Exchange Act and its rules by 
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Although easier to apply than the "pure" out of pocket measure, the 
"expedient" out of pocket approach has its flaws. First, the inside information 
traded upon may be different from the later curative disclosure. In the words 
of one court: "One could not reasonably estimate how the public could have 
reacted to the news that the Titanic was near an iceberg from how it reacted to 
news that the ship had struck an iceberg and sunk.,,37 Second, other factors, 
such as other company developments or overall stock market movements, 
may cause the post-disclosure stock price to differ from the price that would 
have prevailed at the time of the plaintiff's trade with full accurate public 
disclosure.38 
insider trading or tipping. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4:8.3[B], 6:2. In this 
express action, the total damages for all contemporaneous traders are limited to the 
defendant's "profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the 
subject of the violation" (minus any amounts paid by the defendant in an equitable action for 
disgorgement brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission). Securities Exchange Act 
§ 20A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b) (2009). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4:8.3[B], 
6:2. 
In dictum, the Seventh Circuit has said that in § 20A insider trading cases: "Profit gained 
or loss avoided is a contemporaneous measure: the difference between the price the insider 
realizes and the market price of the securities after the news is released." Short v. Bellevue 
Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991). 
In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 664-65 (E.D. Va. 2000), 
endorsed the following measure of the defendant's profit in a § 20A insider trading case: 
"Damages in an action under Section 20A are limited to the profits or losses avoided by the 
illegal transactions and are ordinarily measured by determining 'the difference between the 
price the insider realizes and the market price of the securities after the news is released.'" 
Id (quoting Short, 908 F.2d at 1392). 
In dictum, McGhee v. Joutras, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3542 (N.D. Ill. 1995), seemed to 
assume the appropriateness of looking to the price after curative disclosure when it stated: 
Neither of those statements can be read as a holding as a matter oflaw that 
the next day's market price always freezes the measure of damages in this 
type of lawsuit under Section 20A added to the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 ("1934 Act") .... Instead the subject is clearly one for factual 
presentation and analysis. 
Id at *5 (footnote omitted). 
In a case brought by the SEC seeking disgorgement of insider trading profits, a settlement 
plan for distribution of the disgorged proceeds allowed each public contemporaneous "stock 
seller to recover the difference between the price at which he sold and the price at the close of 
trading on the public disclosure date" less certain offsetting profits. SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 
80,86 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming trial court's approval of plan). 
37 Elkind, 635 F.2d at 170; see Bad News, supra note 24, at 1454; Cornell & Morgan, supra 
note 27, at 890; Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases, 
38 Bus. LAW. 1, 19 (1982). 
38 See In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating: 
Plaintiffs may argue that the 'fair value' of the stock should be drawn from 
its market price following revelation of the fraudulently withheld material .. 
. . Defendants will likely counter that the post-disclosure market price of the 
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stock has been affected by factors unrelated to the disclosure .... Indeed, 
defendants bear no responsibility for the impact of so-called nonactionable 
factors, such as general market conditions. 
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(citations omitted»; Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("While this 
course has the obvious attraction of providing a concrete figure for the true worth of a security 
absent the fraud, it completely disregards the many other factors which influence price 
fluctuations over time of stocks in general or of a particular stock."); Tucker v. Arthur 
Anderson & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Nielsen & Prowse, supra note 25, at 
22-23; Younger, supra note 15, at 20; see also Olazabal, supra note 26, at 361; cf Green v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result in part) (using different terminology than this article but 
objecting to measure of damages that opinion calls "rescissory" measure because "it permits a 
defrauded purchaser to place upon the defendant the burden of any decline in the value of the 
stock between the date of purchase and the date of disclosure of the fraud even though only a 
portion of that decline may have been proximately caused by the defendant's wrong. The 
other portion is the result of market forces unrelated to the wrong."). 
The "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference" of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 made the following statement: 
Typically, in an action involving a fraudulent misstatement or omission, the 
investor's damages are presumed to be the difference between the price the 
investor paid for the security and the price of the security on the day the 
corrective information gets disseminated to the market. 
Between the time a misrepresentation is made and the time the market 
receives corrected information, however, the price of the security may rise 
or fall for reasons unrelated to the alleged fraud. According to an analysis 
provided to the Senate Securities Subcommittee, on average, damages in 
securities litigation comprise approximately 27.7% of market loss. 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 u.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741 (citing 
report prepared by Princeton Venture Research). 
This is one reason why Congress enacted § 21D(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, which limits damages established by reference to the market price of a security. This 
provision is reprinted infra in the text accompanying note 46. 
In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), was a non-
insider-trading case that adopted the expedient out of pocket measure of damages for buyers 
who still retained their shares at the time the massive fraud was revealed to the market. The 
court adjusted the damage amount for the portion of the price decrease due to "market and 
other factors." Id. One factor was "the general decline of retail consumer electronic stock." Id. 
A possible complication is that curative disclosure may not take place at one time, but 
may gradually leak out through various sources, including the media. See Bad News, supra 
note 24, at 1454-55. For discussion of closure in securities class actions through leaked 
curative information, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4:3.3[A]. For discussion of the 
possibility of curative disclosure by third parties and/or through leaks, see id. §§ 4:3.3[A], § 
4:7.3 n.629, § 6:13.3 n.668 and accompanying text; cf Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (discussing loss causation and stating: "if, say, the purchaser sells the 
shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have 
led to any loss" (emphasis added»; Lormand v. US Unwired Inc., 565 F.3d 228,261 (5th Cir. 
2009) ("Thus, loss causation may be pleaded on the theory that the truth gradually emerged 
through a series of partial disclosures and that an entire series of partial disclosures caused the 
stock price deflation."). Nevertheless, even if curative disclosure is gradual and by third 
parties and/or through leaks, at the time of full curative disclosure by the issuer, the price 
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A variant of the "expedient" out of pocket measure looks to the price 
change at curative dissemination and uses this change as the measure of 
damages to the plaintiff. The dollar amount of the price change at 
dissemination could be added or subtracted from the plaintiffs transaction 
price to estimate the true value at the time of the plaintiffs trade; 
alternatively, the percentage price change at dissemination could be applied to 
the plaintiff s transaction price to estimate the true value at the time of the 
plaintiffs transaction.39 
should fully reflect the disclosed information. Cf Fox, supra note 24, at 851 ("The efficient 
market hypothesis rules out any continuing inflation in price once there has been an 
unambiguous public announcement of the falsity of the misstatement."). 
Although not discussing damages, but rather "loss causation" and a subsequent resale, 
the Supreme Court's following comments would also undermine looking to the price at 
curative disclosure to measure the amount of original inflation by a material misstatement or 
nondisclosure: 
When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price, 
that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed 
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-
specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken 
separately or together account for some or all of that lower price. (The same 
is true in respect to a claim that a share's higher price is lower than it would 
otherwise have been-a claim we do not consider here.) Other things being 
equal, the longer the time between purchase and sale, the more likely that 
this is so, i.e., the more likely that other factors caused the loss. 
Dura, 544 U.S. at 342-43. For discussion of intervening causes and "loss causation," see Joel 
H. Bernstein & Ira A. Schochet, Loss Causation and the Global Economic Crisis, 41 SEC. 
REG. L. REp. (BNA) 1413 (July 27,2009). 
39 See Bad News, supra note 24, at 1433-34 (describing these two approaches plus possible 
third variant); Nielsen & Prowse, supra note 25, at 17-18 (also describing third approach); id. 
at 17 ("measure of inflation could conceivably be based on the dollar value of the stock price 
decline due to the corrective disclosure or the percentage decline due to the corrective 
disclosures"). See also Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 966-67 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("When markets are liquid and respond quickly to news, the drop 
when the truth appears is a good measure of the value of the information, making it an 
appropriate measure of damages."). 
For a circuit court opinion inviting the trial judge to look at the percentage change at 
curative dissemination, see Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566,577 (2d Cir.) (non-
insider-trading case), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982). 
For discussion of the use ofa "value line" (a variant of the price change at dissemination 
approach) to calculate the "true value" of the stock during the entire period of the fraud, see In 
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1180-82 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (non-insider-trading case 
citing other cases and authorities); Rosenbloom & Kroboth, supra note 27, at B13 ("A 
common method for computing price inflation [due to fraud] is to measure the price change 
after a curative disclosure and use this figure to represent inflation for every day of the class 
period."). 
For discussion of variants of these approaches, see Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer 
Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5 Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A 
Forward-Looking Assessment, 51 Bus. LAW. 1203, 1203-07 (1996). 
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For discussion of these approaches and others, see Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, 
Solving a Profound Flaw in Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: Utilizing a Derivative of Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory to Measure Rule lOb-5 Damages, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1097 (1997). 
See generally Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages 
Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 Bus. LAW. 483, 490-95 
(2001); Michael Barclay & Frank C. Torchio, A Comparison of Trading Models Used for 
Calculating Aggregate Damages in Securities Litigation, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 105 
(2001); William M. Bassin, A Two Trader Population Share Retention Modelfor Estimating 
Damages in Shareholder Class Action Litigations, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 49 (2000); John 
Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring Damages in 
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. lL. Bus. & FIN. 213 (2003); Leon P. Gold & Sarah 
S. Gold, 'Daubert' Precludes Aggregate Damages Model in Class Action, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 10, 
2001, at 3, col. 1. 
For related discussion, see supra note 27. 
Although discussing not damages, but "loss causation," Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005), states: 
Indeed, the Restatement of Torts, in setting forth the judicial consensus, 
says that a person who "misrepresents the fmancial condition of a 
corporation in order to sell its stock" becomes liable to a relying purchaser 
"for the loss" the purchaser sustains "when the facts ... become generally 
known" and "as a result" share value "depreciate[s]." 
§ 548A, Comment b, at 107. 
Dura also subsequently notes "[t]he complaint's failure to claim that Dura's share price 
fell significantly after the truth become known .... " Id at 347. 
Suppose the issuer makes curative disclosure, and the stock price does not change. Does 
this preclude a fmding of "loss causation?" In Dura, the Supreme Court did not address this 
question. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 ("We need not, and do not, consider other proximate 
cause or loss-related questions."); cf id at 343 ("The same is true in respect to a claim that a 
share's higher price is lower than it otherwise would have been-a claim we do not consider 
here."). For related discussion, see supra notes 26, 38; Kaufman, supra note 33, at 43 (stating 
Dura "rejects the harsh position ... that loss causation requires a showing that defendants 
made a corrective disclosure of the fraud followed by a causally related price drop"); Robert 
P. Varian & Richard L. Gallagher, Loss Causation in Securities Class Actions After Dura, 38 
REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 241, 246 (2005) ("[P]hantom losses are losses purportedly 
caused by price inflation but not followed by any significant price decline, due to the 
existence of other market factors that prevent the price from falling significantly, or at all. In 
reversing the Ninth Circuit's loss causation approach, the Supreme Court employed language 
that may prompt ambitious plaintiffs to seek recovery of such losses."). But cf Fry, supra note 
33, at 74 (discussing whether "plaintiffs may be able to show a loss through a slow dissipation 
in the stock price such as when a misrepresentation has diminishing effect on the price of a 
stock over time so that no change in price occurs when a fraud is revealed"); id at 75-76, 77 
(discussing problems with this approach and concluding Dura likely precludes proof by this 
dissipation of price inflation method of proving loss). 
For an argument against a flat finding of no "loss causation" in a scenario where the 
issuer makes curative disclosure and the stock price does not change, see Patrick J. Coughlin 
et aI., What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review the Supreme 
Court's Opinion and Its Importfor Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1,21-30 
(2005); Fox, supra note 24, at 850-72, 874-75 (although conceding that bright line rule of "no 
loss" causation might be justified when price does not change after issuer curative disclosure 
and plaintiff has already reversed her transaction earlier); cf Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at 
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This alternative approach of looking at the price change at curative 
dissemination also has problems. In the words of one opinion, the drop after 
corrective disclosure was: 
circumstantial evidence of the inflation when purchased, but it 
is not the exclusive method of measuring inflation. The fact 
finder may rely on other methods of determining actual value 
on the date of purchase. . .. [T]he drop after a corrective 
disclosure will not be conclusive of the amount of original 
inflation, both because the correction may be only partial ... 
and because the prolonged nature of the fraud introduces other 
market variables which may affect the amount the market 
reacted to disclosures .... 40 
Furthermore, the post-curative-disclosure stock price change may be 
due in part to other factors, such as general industry or stock market 
trends.41 In addition, by the time of full curative disclosure by the 
Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REv. 151, 184 (2009) ("Although this 
might well signal that the market was never fooled in the fIrst place, it could also be explained 
by predisclosure leaks, independent discovery of the truth, or the mixing in of good news with 
the subsequent acknowledgement of the truth."); Olazabal, supra note 26, at 362-68 (arguing 
that plaintiff who pays an inflated price because of defendant's fraud may be harmed 
regardless whether plaintiff eventually sells at price higher or lower than original price). 
40 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975) (non-insider-trading case), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to 
Lie More After Dura Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 664 (2007) ("[A] particularly large 
and important drawback of the inductive ex post approach is that it assumes that 
circumstances have not changed, other than the revelation of the truth, between the time of the 
purchase decision and the price drop." (footnote omitted)). 
41 See In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he 
degree to which the post-revelation decline is attributable to disclosure, and to what extent the 
decline was the result of nonactionable market and industry trends is diffIcult to ascertain."); 
Bad News, supra note 24, at 1432 ("One cannot simply assume that the amount by which the 
stock price decreased following the announcement equals the per-share damages, however, 
because the stock price may have been affected by factors other than the securities 
violation."). 
For discussion of how fInance theory might attempt to fIlter out the effect of the overall 
stock market movement on the individual stock's price change at dissemination, see Bad 
News, supra note 24, at 1433-34; Fischel, supra note 37, at 17-19. For a description of the 
disparate results of expert testimony using fmance theory, see Bad News, supra note 24, at 
1425-26, 1456-57. 
For discussion of event study methodology (a statistical technique that estimates the stock 
price impact of occurrences such as corporate announcements and disentangles this effect 
from information that affects stock prices marketwide), see RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. 
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 185-230 (2d ed. 1995); Allen, 
supra note 27; Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud 
Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 1. CORP. L. 11 (2009); Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun 
Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 
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issuer, the stock price may already have partially or fully adjusted 
because of insider trading, leaks by the issuer, or curative disclosure 
by various third party sources, including the media.42 In addition, the 
market may take time to digest fully the curative disclosure43 or may 
[Vol. 10 
2009 WIS. L. REv. 199, 228-30; Jay W. Eisenhofer et aI., Securities Fraud, Stock Price 
Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss 
Causation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1419, 1424-28 (2004); Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 166-70; 
Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud 
Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545, 556-72 
(1994); Frank Torchio, Proper Event Sutdy Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 
159 (2009). 
For discussion of the use of both "event study" and "value line" methodology to calculate 
damages in securities fraud class actions, see Rethinking, supra note 24, at 1491-92; 
Eisenhofer et aI., supra at 1424-28; Jeffrey M. Goldman, Avoiding Blurred Lines: The 
Computation of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Securities Class Actions Lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit 
and a Proposal for a More Sensible System, 2 HASTINGS Bus. LJ. 261, 265-74 (2006); 
Nielsen & Prowse, supra note 25, at 16-18,21-22; id. at 20-21 (criticizing some variants of 
this methodology as incompatible with Dura); Scudder, supra note 24, at 447-51; Younger, 
supra note 15, at 21. For additional discussion of the "value line" approach, see supra note 
39. 
One article remarked: 
Frequently, measurement of the difference between the price paid and the 
value of the security begins with the decline in the price of the security after 
disclosure of the facts that were misrepresented or omitted. Experts then 
duel over how much of that descent resulted from the disclosure of the 
"truth" and how much from other factors, such as general market declines 
or price declines in securities issued by companies similar to the defendant. 
Fisher, supra note 25, at 55 (footnote omitted). 
One commentator has noted still another problem with looking at the change in price at 
curative dissemination to calculate the true value of the stock at the time of the plaintiffs 
trade. At the time of an announcement of bad news, investors may predict that litigation may 
follow and that the issuer will be forced to settle. This anticipation will accentuate the decline 
in stock price at the time of the announcement. See Bad News, supra note 24, at 1435-40. But 
see Dunbar & Sen, supra, at 234 (arguing that this prospect will have little impact on price 
because typical settlement has been small and insurance usually pays most of settlement and 
defendant's legal expenses). 
The problems of looking at the price change at curative disclosure are related to but not 
the same as the problems of looking at the price at curative disclosure. The latter problems are 
discussed supra at notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
42 See Fox, supra note 24, at 851-55; supra note 38 and sources cited therein. 
While discussing loss causation, one commentator has stated: "[C]orrective disclosures 
can come from anyone-and importantly do not have to come from the company-to be 
considered revelations of the truth .... Revelations of the truth can also take the form of a 
series of disclosures instead of a single disclosing event." Fry, supra note 33, at 66-67. 
43 See Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 175-78 (delayed reaction may be due to (1) inferring 
additional information about implications of the curative disclosure, (2) subsequent absence 
of additional bad news, or (3) additional details provided subsequently by issuer). 
For an example of a case in which the plaintiff alleged a time lag between the corrective 
disclosure and the stock price decline, and the circuit court reversed the trial court's dismissal 
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initially overreact to the curative disclosure.44 Another possible 
difficulty is that, simultaneous with the curative disclosure, the issuer 
may disclose unrelated information.45 
17 
Section 101(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
added a new section 21D(e) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
of the complaint based on failure adequately to plead loss causation, see In re Gilead Sciences 
Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049. 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (non-insider trading case). 
44 See Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 175; Torts, supra note 24, at 855. 
With fraud by a company, another question is whether a stock price decline after 
revelation of the fraud in part reflects the corporation's loss of credibility. See Langevoort, 
supra note 39, at 183 n.40; see also Dunbar & Sen, supra note 41, at 235. For an argument 
that plaintiffs should be able to recover damages resulting from declines in the stock price 
attributable to the market's reassessment of the integrity of management or the company's 
internal controls, see Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 169 (2009). 
45 See Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 168-69; Nielsen & Prowse, supra note 25, at 22-23; 
cf Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 
406-11 (5th Cir. 2009) (refusing to certify plaintiff class of buyers because they failed to 
allege adequately causal link between drop in company's stock price and revelation of 
defendant's questionable circulation practices; although relevant press release caused stock 
price decline, release contained three separate pieces of information, only one piece corrected 
prior allegedly fraudulent statements; id. at 409 (quoting Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. 
Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2007)); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. 
Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,270 (5th Cir. 2007) (non-insider trading case; while 
denying class certification under the fraud on the market theory, stating: "when unrelated 
negative statements are announced contemporaneous of a corrective disclosure, the plaintiff 
must prove 'that it is more probable than not that it was this negative statement, and not other 
unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant amount of the decline'" (quoting 
Greenberg v. Crossroad Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 2004))); Spindler, supra note 
40, at 687-89 (company may have other projects than one lied about; success or failure of 
these other projects also affects share price decline). 
When the issuer makes curative disclosure at one point during the day and makes an 
unrelated announcement at a different time on the same day, one possible solution is to 
examine the intra-day stock price movement after the curative disclosure (that is, the price 
movement during the day). See Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 168-69; Nielsen & Prowse, 
supra note 25, at 22 n.17. 
With an affirmative misrepresentation by the issuer (as opposed to insider trading), still 
another approach to measuring damages is to look to the price change at the time of the 
issuer's fraudulent statement. For discussion of such an approach to measure loss causation, 
see Ferrell & Saha, supra note 33, at 185-86; cf Fox, supra note 24, at 852 ("The strongest 
alternative evidence [ofloss causation] would be a showing that the misstatement itself, when 
initially made, was immediately followed by a significant price increase."). But cf Nielsen & 
Prowse, supra note 25, at 17 n.4 ("Early in the development of damages models, some 
damages experts would focus, not on the stock price impact when the allegedly corrective 
information was released to the market, but directly on the stock price impact of the alleged 
misrepresentations themselves to calculate [stock price] inflation. Over time this methodology 
declined in popularity mainly due to its inability to measure the stock price impact of alleged 
omissions by the company."). 
18 UC Davis Business Law Journal 
LIMITATION ON DAMAGES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), in 
any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff 
seeks to establish damages by reference to the market price of a 
security, the award of damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed 
the difference between the purchase or sale price paid or 
received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff for the subject security 
and the mean trading price of that security during the 90-day 
period beginning on the date on which the information 
correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis for the 
action is disseminated to the market. 
(2) EXCEPTION.-In any private action arising under this title 
in which the plaintiff seeks to establish damages by reference 
to the market price of a security, if the plaintiff sells or 
repurchases the subject security prior to the expiration of the 
90-day period described in paragraph (1), the plaintiffs 
damages shall not exceed the difference between the purchase 
or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plaintiff 
for the security and the mean trading price of the security 
during the period beginning immediately after dissemination of 
information correcting the misstatement or omission and 
ending on the date on which the plaintiff sells or repurchases 
the security. 
(3) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this subsection, the "mean 
trading price" of a security shall be an average of the daily 
trading price of that security, determined as of the close of the 
market each day during the 90-day period referred to in 
paragraph (1).46 
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This provision sets a ceiling on any measure that "seeks to establish 
46 Section 101(b) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, adding a new 
section 2ID(e) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e). 
For discussion of § 21D(e)'s limitation of damages, see Alessi, supra note 39, at 495-96; 
Dickey & Mayer, supra note 39; Fisher, supra note 25, at 35, 56-57; Lowenfels & Bromberg, 
supra note 15, at 1111-13; Walter Rieman et aI., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995: A User's Guide, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 143, 168-70 (1996); id at 169 ("This rule does not 
fundamentally change the principle upon which the damages under Rule 10b-5 are 
calculated."); Simplicity, supra note 25, at 1177-78, 1193-1200; Nathaniel Carden, Comment, 
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions 
of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 879, 894-98 (1998); Scudder, supra note 25. 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 also enacted certain provisions 
dealing with joint and several liability, proportionate fault, and settlement judgment 
reductions. For discussion of these provisions, see St. Eve & Pilz, supra note 15. 
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damages by reference to the market price of a security.,,47 By imposing this 
maximum, Congress implicitly recognized such measures of damages, 
including both the "expedient" out of pocket measure discussed above and the 
cover measure analyzed below in Part I(D). 
Indeed, the "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of 
Conference" described as "typical" the "expedient" out of pocket measure: 
"Typically, in any action involving a fraudulent misstatement or omission, the 
investor's damages are presumed to be the difference between the price the 
investor paid for the security and the price of the security on the day the 
corrective information gets disseminated to the market.,,48 
C. Rescissory 
In some circumstances, the courts adopt rescissory damages as the 
measure.49 This measure attempts to undo the fraudulent transaction and 
47 For the language of the provision, see supra text accompanying note 46. 
48 H.R. CONF. REp. No. 369, 104th Cong., at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 741; 
27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), Dec. 1, 1995, at 1890, 1893; see Simplicity, supra note 25, at 
1181 & n.19 ("the Conference Report presumes this [expedient out of pocket] to be the 
measure used in the typical case"). The Conference Report, however, then notes a problem 
with this approach. See supra note 38. 
49 See Ambassador Hotel Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) 
("If true rescission is no longer possible (perhaps because the plaintiff no longer owns the 
subject of the sale), the court may order its monetary equivalent."); id. at 1030 ("The district 
court may apply a rescissory measure of damages in appropriate circumstances." (citing DCD 
Programs, Ltd. and Blackie)); DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1447 (9th Cir. 
1996); Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1336 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We believe that 
rescissory damages are best suited to the harm and to the facts of this case."), aff'd on other 
grounds, 507 U.S. 179 (1993); Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,441-42 (7th Cir. 
1987) (stating in dictum that there are two standard measures of damages in securities law and 
that one is "rescissionary" measure), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); In re Letterman Bros. 
Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967,972-73 (5th Cir. 1986) (mentioning "rescissional measure" 
but fmding it inappropriate in that case), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987); Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975) ("While out of pocket loss is the ordinary standard 
in a lOb-5 suit, it is within the discretion of the district judge in appropriate circumstances to 
apply a rescissory measure."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Glick v. Campagna, 613 
F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[i]f the defendant no longer owns the stock or it is otherwise 
unavailable because of a merger or other intervening event, then the court may award 
rescissory damages to place the plaintiff in the same financial position he would have been 
were it possible to return the stock.") (dictum); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 
1967) ("[W]here this [rescission] is impossible because of the disposal or retirement of the 
stock, then equivalent value of the stock at the time of resale ... or at the time of judgment .. 
. should be the proper measure of damage."), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Kronfield v. 
Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court may award rescissory 
damages when out of pocket damages are zero and gravamen of the action is not whether 
plaintiff purchased at fair price but that plaintiff bought at all); cf Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 
478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986) ("We shall therefore assume, arguendo, that a rescissory recovery 
may sometimes be proper on a § 1O(b) claim, and that this is such a case."); Gottlieb v. Sandia 
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return the defrauded party to her position before the fraudulent inducement to 
enter into the trade. 50 In other words, rescissory damages award a plaintiff the 
dollar amount at the time of judgment necessary to put her back in her original 
position prior to the fraudulent transaction. The rescissory measure implicitly 
presumes that the plaintiff would not have traded but-for the defendant's 
fraud. 
Courts usually require the plaintiff to prove a contractual relationship 
with the defendant. 51 Most stock market insider trading plaintiffs are not in 
contractual privity with the defendant. 52 Therefore, this measure of damages 
would not be appropriate for those plaintiffs. Arguably, this measure would 
give such plaintiffs a "free ride" to gain speculative profits from stock price 
changes until the date of judgment without risking any money. 
Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ("[I]fthe actual stock or assets which were 
originally traded are no longer available, damages will be awarded in the amount of the 
difference between the present market value of the consideration originally given and the 
consideration received.") (dictum), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971). But cf Randall, 478 U.S. at 661 ("[W]hether and under what 
circumstances ... a rescissory measure ... is available ... is ... unsettled)." 
For related discussion of rescissory damages, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 
4:9.1, at 4-246 n.747. See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4:9.2 (dictum). 
For discussion of Randall's treatment of damages, see Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra 
note 15, at 1089-92. 
50 See Robertson v. White, 81 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Rescissory damages serve to 
place the Class in the same position they would have been but for [defendant's] fraud." (citing 
Arthur Young & Co.)); Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1337 (8th Cir. 1991) 
("Rescissory damages place a plaintiff in the same position she would have been in had she 
not been induced to enter into the transaction."), aff'd on other grounds, 507 U.S. 179 (1993); 
Burch, supra note 23, at 366; cf Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,554 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (describing "rescissional" measure adopted by trial court), modified on other 
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Michael J. Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm: The Real Measure of 
Damages Under Rule lOb-5, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 29, 101 (1989) (discussing Fifth Circuit 
Huddleston opinion). But see Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,441-42 (7th Cir. 
1987) ("[T]he 'rescissionary' measure of damages is based on the defendant's gain. The court 
reverses the transaction and compels defendants to return the purchase price or disgorge any 
gains they received." (dictum)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). 
51 See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554 ("Use of the rescissional measure is usually limited to 
cases involving either privity between plaintiff and defendant or some specific fiduciary duty 
owed by brokers to their customers."); Kaufman, supra note 50, at 101-02 (discussing 
Huddleston); see also Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,1341-44 (9th Cir. 
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part) (rescissory measure of 
damages is not appropriate in case where plaintiffs purchased in open market and did not deal 
face to face with corporate defendant). But cf Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,909 (9th Cir. 
1975) (in class action against issuer for misrepresentations, stating "it is within the discretion 
of the district judge in appropriate circumstances to apply a rescissory measure"), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). For additional discussion of the rescissory measure of damages, 
see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4:9.1, 4:9.2, 4:9.4. 
52 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, ch. 6, especially §§ 6: 1, 6:2, 6:3, 6:4, 6:8, 6:9, 6: 10. 
Ed. 1] Measuring Insider Trading Damages for a Private Plaintiff 21 
On the other hand, a plaintiff on the opposite side of an insider trade 
might be entitled to rescissory damages. The remedy of rescission should be 
available to such a party in privity who successfully sues an insider trading 
defendant under the classical relationship theory. 53 It is unclear is whether 
rescission is available against a misappropriator. 54 Also uncertain is whether 
Exchange Act section 20A itself creates a statutory cause of action for 
rescission by the party on the other side of the insider trade. 55 
If rescission is available to a plaintiff against an insider trading 
defendant, rescissory damages may be an alternative remedy, especially if 
rescission is no longer feasible. Indeed, courts might view such damages as a 
variant of rescission rather than money damages. 56 
Trades of large blocks of stock have some aspects of face-to-face 
trades.57 If a plaintiff purchases a large block from an insider trader, a court 
might sometimes be willing to grant rescissory damages. 
D. Cover 
The cover measure implicitly presumes that the plaintiff would not 
have traded but-for the defendant's fraud. This approach also implicitly 
assumes that the plaintiff is entitled to a rescissory measure of damages. 58 
Nevertheless, this approach imposes on the plaintiff the obligation to mitigate 
damages by reversing her trade within a "reasonable" time after curative 
disclosure. 
The main case adopting this measure is Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co. ,59 a suit based on an issuer's misleading press release. 6o The court stated: 
53 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 4:9.1, 4.9.2. 
54 See id. § 4:9.3. 
55 See id. § 4:9.4. 
56 See id. § 4:9.1, at 4-246 n.747. 
57 See id. § 3:3.1; Mark J. Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider 
Trader, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 67-69 (2005); William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider 
Trading: Victims, Violators and Remedies--Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a 
Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REv. 27, 30-31 (2000). 
58 See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168 n.25 (2d. Cir. 1980) (describing 
Mitchell as "modified rescissionary measure"); Phillip J. Leas, Note, The Measure of 
Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 
379 (1974) ("Mitchell . .. set forth a distinctive rationale to support a measure of damages 
which was essentially rescissory."). 
For discussion of the rescissory measure, see supra Part I.C. 
59 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). For discussion of this case, see 
James H. Chesnutt, Damages for SEC Rule lOb-5 Violations - the Measure of Damages 
Caused by False and Misleading Statements is the Difference between the Plaintiff's Selling 
Price and the Highest Daily Price Attained during a REasoanble Reinvestment Period. 
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), 49 TEX. L. REv. 1141 
(1971). 
For an earlier circuit case adopting a cover-like measure of damages (in aff"mnative 
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We believe the measure of damages used should award the 
reasonable investor the amount it would have taken him to 
invest in the ... market within a reasonable period of time after 
he became informed of the April 16 release [corrective 
disclosure] . . .. The damages then should be based on the 
highest value of TGS stock between Monday, April 20 and a 
reasonable time thereafter. Whether we conclude such duration 
should be an added nine trading days (through Friday, May 1) 
which seems more reasonable in these circumstances, or the 
seventeen additional trading days imposed by the trial court 
(through Wednesday, May 13) is irrelevant to the award. For in 
either event, the highest value was achieved on Wednesday, 
April 29 (at $59) prior to the expiration of either time limit.61 
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In a case involving an insider trading defendant, dictum in an en banc 
misrepresentation!nondisclosure fact situation), see Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 575-76 
(4th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff bought stock when corporation was closely held; damages measured 
when stock was fIrst publicly traded without attached debentures (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968))), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 
(1970); see also Foster v. Fin. Tech. Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975) (non-insider-
trading case; denying consequential damages because: "As in all IOb-5 cases, their damages 
are limited by what they would have realized if they had acted upon their claim [which they 
settled in exchange for securities] when they fIrst learned of the fraud or had reason to know 
of it."); id. ("[W]here a reasonable man ... would have taken action to protect himself ... the 
chain of causation is cut and plaintiff cannot recover damages for subsequent losses."). For a 
district court opinion adopting a cover-like measure, see American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable 
Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 764-66 (E.D. Va. 1980) (affIrmative misrepresentation! 
nondisclosure in face to face transaction). 
60 446 F.2d at 92-93,96-102. 
61 Id. at 105. For discussion of the cover measure and Mitchell, see Younger, supra note 15, at 
22. 
Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981), 
dealt with § 10(b)lRule 10b-5 violations by a stockbroker who misrepresented the risks of 
using margin and of purchasing certain stocks. The court affIrmed the trial court's calculation 
of damages based on the plaintiffs' imputed sale of their stock when they knew of the fraud. 
Id at 621; see also Nye v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198-1200 (8th Cir. 
1978) (applying somewhat similar approach to damages in another case involving stockbroker 
misrepresentation to customer). 
A non-insider-trading case, Estate ofStoddardv. Manufacturers National Bank of Grand 
Rapids, 593 N.W.2d 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), applied Michigan law to measure the 
appropriate damages against a bank under promissory estoppel. Both parties agreed on a 
measure of damages similar to the "cover measure." See id at 633 (describing "New York 
rule" as adopted in Vos v. Child, Hulswitt & Co., 137 N.W. 209 (Mich. 1912)). The court 
applied this measure. See id at 633-39. 
For discussion of a cover-like measure of damages under the Commodities Exchange Act 
and citations of cases under various bodies of law adopting a cover-like measure of damages 
(including Mitchell), see Schultz v. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, 716 F.2d 136, 
140-41 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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First Circuit opinion endorsed the cover measure when the plaintiff buys or 
sells publicly traded securities.62 Citing, inter alia, Mitchell, the court stated 
that "when a seller of publicly traded securities has learned of previously 
undisclosed material facts, and decides nevertheless not to replace the sold 
securities, he cannot later claim that his failure to obtain subsequent stock 
appreciation was a proximate consequence of his prior ignorance.,,63 
The Second Circuit in the insider trading case of Elkind also 
apparently adopted the cover measure, but in conjunction with an overall 
recovery ceiling of the insider trading profit: 64 
(1) to allow any uninformed investor, where a reasonable 
investor would either have delayed his purchase or not 
purchased at all if he had had the benefit of the tipped 
information, to recover any post-purchase decline in market 
value of his shares up to a reasonable time after he learns of 
the tipped information or after there is public disclosure of it 
but (2) limit his recovery to the amount gained by the tippee as 
a result of his selling at the earlier date rather than delaying his 
sale until the parties could trade on equal informational basis.65 
(Part I(B) above reprinted section 21D(e) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.66) That provision sets a ceiling on any measure that "seeks to 
establish damages by reference to the market price of a security.,,67 The 
maximum is based on "the mean trading price of that security during the 90-
day period beginning on the date [of dissemination].,,68 Courts awarding the 
cover measure could not exceed this ceiling. Nevertheless, by imposing this 
limitation, Congress implicitly recognized measures of damages based on the 
market price ofthe security, including the cover measure. 
62 See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47,48,53-54 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (dictum). 
63 Id. at 53 (dictum). For additional discussion of MacDonald and the measure of the 
defendant's profits when the SEC seeks disgorgement, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, 
§ 7:3.2. 
64 See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980). For discussion 
of the Elkind ceiling, see supra note 36; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4:8.3[B]. 
65 Elkind, 635 F.2d at 172 (emphasis added). Confusingly, the opinion earlier states that it 
need not pass on the modified rescissionary cover measure of Mitchell. Id. at 168 n.25. 
Nevertheless, the court seems to endorse that measure, at least in conjunction with the overall 
ceiling of the insider trading profit. 
66 See supra text accompanying note 46. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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E. Distinction Between the "Expedient" Out of Pocket and Cover 
Measures 
This article earlier69 discussed the revised trial court opinion in the 
insider trading case of Elkind. 70 Although it cited Mitchell, it actually adopted 
the "expedient" out of pocket measure.71 This decision blurred the distinction 
between the cover and "expedient" out of pocket measures. 
Although the "expedient" out of pocket and cover measures have some 
surface similarities, they are different. The "expedient" out of pocket measure, 
like the "pure" out of pocket measure, assumes that the plaintiff would have 
traded at the same time anyway even without the fraud, but at a more 
attractive price. Nevertheless, to avoid the practical difficulty of ascertaining 
this hypothetical better price, the "expedient" out of pocket measure either 
substitutes the price reached after curative dissemination or looks at the 
(dollar or percentage) price change at dissemination (possibly with some 
adjustment). In contrast, the cover measure seems to assume implicitly that 
the plaintiff would not have traded absent the fraud, but imposes on the 
plaintiff a duty to mitigate her losses by reversing her transaction within a 
reasonable time after curative disclosure. 
The "expedient" out of pocket measure is likely to use an earlier date 
than the cover measure. Market-makers and institutional investors obviously 
learn news and respond sooner than smaller investors.72 Because of the quick 
reaction of market-makers and institutional investors, the market price may 
adjust fairly quickly to an announcement. 73 Thus, the "expedient" out of 
69 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
70 Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 635 F.2d 
156 (2d Cir. 1980). 
71 As the circuit court in Elkind noted: "While the district court cited to Mitchell, its opinion 
makes clear that it was applying the out-of-pocket measure of damages." 635 F.2d at 168 
n.25. Actually, in this article's terminology, the district court applied the "expedient" out of 
pocket measure. 
Below is an example of the trial court's blurring of the cover and "expedient" out of 
pocket measures: 
Mitchell, supra, has been criticized for using the standard of the time it 
would take a reasonable investor, rather than the market, to absorb the 
information disclosed . . . . Under the facts of the instant case, the court 
does not fmd this distinction significant . . . . [T]he court finds that eight 
trading days is sufficient time to allow the market or a reasonable investor 
to become apprised of the new information. 
Elkind, 472 F. Supp. at 133 (emphasis added). 
72 See Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 35 UC DAVIS L. 
REv. 533, 534 (2002). 
73 But see Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548, 563 (D. Utah 1970) ("A 
few days, is ... much too early to let the New York market reflect the true value .... "), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
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pocket measure may select a date soon after news is public. 
In contrast, the cover measure is likely to use a later date than the 
"expedient" out of pocket measure. Investors vary greatly in their reaction 
times to a news announcement. 74 When applying the cover measure to a class 
of plaintiffs that includes smaller investors, a court is likely to select a later 
deadline to mitigate losses. After all, these ordinary investors must find out 
about the announcement, absorb it, overcome any reluctance to realize 
"paper" losses, and raise additional funds to reverse their transactions. 75 
Finally, the cover measure always looks at a stock price (at a time after 
curative disclosure). In contrast, the expedient out of pocket measure 
sometimes looks at a stock price and sometimes a stock price change (after 
curative disclosure). 
F. Disgorgement of Windfall Profits 
Sometimes, despite the literal "actual damages" limit of Exchange Act 
section 28(a)/6 the plaintiff may recover the defendant's windfall profits 
generated subsequent to curative disclosure. 77 Such recoveries have usually 
How quickly the market price reflects a news announcement depends on the extent to 
which the stock market is efficient. For discussion of whether the stock market is efficient, see 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 2:.2.2 & n.31, 3:3.7 & n.l03. For discussion of some 
factors that might determine whether a security trades in an "efficient market," see id § 4:7.3. 
74 See Nye v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978) 
("Obviously, the reasonable time period will vary with the circumstances."; awarding 
damages somewhat like cover in case involving stockbroker misrepresentation to a customer); 
see also Leas, supra note 58, at 379 ("The reduction of the investor population to a single 
standard seems particularly unrealistic."); cf American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 
493 F. Supp. 721, 765 n.79 (E.D. Va. 1980) (fmding that reasonable time to cover is two 
weeks in case awarding cover-like measure; court considered number of factors, including 
sophistication of corporate plaintiff and large size of block sold-lO% of another company). 
75 For discussion of some of the difficulties encountered by the ordinary investor in covering 
his or her loss, see Chesnutt, supra note 59, at 1148; see also Leas, supra note 58, at 380 
(discussing problems of "long term" investors in covering); cf Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir. 1971) (quoted supra at note 61; corrective disclosure was on 
April 16; court based cover damages on highest price reached between Monday, April 20, and 
either Friday, May 1 or Wednesday, May 13; highest price was same during either time 
range), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2009). For the pertinent language of § 28(a), see supra note 18. For 
additional discussion of Exchange Act § 28(a), see supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
77 See Randall v. Lofisgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986) (dictum) (citing and quoting Ute 
and stating that Exchange Act § 28(a) does not impose "a rigid requirement that every 
recovery ... must be limited to the net economic harm suffered by the plaintiff'); Affiliated 
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) ("[U]nder § 28 of the Act ... where 
the defendant received more than the seller's actual loss ... damages are the amount of 
defendant's profit") (dictum). For discussion of Randall's treatment of damages, see 
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 15, at 1089-92. For discussion of the disgorgement of 
windfall profits under Rule 10b-5, see id at 1098-1102; Burch, supra note 23, at 365-66. 
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occurred in the close corporation context.78 Janigan v. Taylor79 held that "[i]t 
is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit, even of windfalls, 
than to let the fraudulent party keep them,,,8o thereby focusing on the 
deterrence rationale.81 This measure is usually applied when the plaintiff sells 
shares that greatly increase in value after the sale, if the plaintiff can prove 
One court has linked the disgorgement of windfall profits and the rescissory measures. 
See Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429,441-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating in dictum: 
"the 'rescissionary' measure of damages is based on the defendant's gain. The court reverses 
the transaction and compels defendants to return the purchase price or disgorge any gains they 
received"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). Similarly, Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 
1226, 1241 (7th Cir. 1988), mentioned that disgorgement avoids unjust emichment of the 
defendant, but also emphasized that "disgorgement is meant to place a defrauded seller in the 
same position he would have occupied had the buyer's fraud not induced him to enter the 
transaction." 
Nevertheless, this article assumes that the disgorgement measure focuses on the 
defendant's gain, while the rescissory measure focuses on the plaintiff's loss. The rescissory 
measure assumes that the defendant would not have traded but for the defendant's fraud and 
seeks to restore the plaintiff to her original position. See supra Part I.C. 
The disgorgement of an insider trading defendant's windfall profits generated subsequent 
to curative disclosure is different from the disgorgement of defendant's profits resulting 
directly from the trade made on material nonpublic information. The latter ceiling on recovery 
was endorsed first by the Second Circuit in an implied cause of action against an insider 
trading defendant (see supra note 36; notes 64-65 and accompanying text; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 4.8.3[B]) and then by Congress in its express cause of action 
against insider trading defendants (see supra note 36; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 1, § 
4.8.3[A]). 
78 See Pidcock v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 854 F.2d 443 (1Ith Cir. 1988); Rochez Bros., Inc. v 
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,405, 411-l3 (3d Cir. 1974); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781,783, 
786-87 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); see also Siebel v. Scott, 725 F.2d 995, 
997, 1001-02 (5th Cir.) (plaintiffs sold their limited partnership interests; plaintiffs were 7 out 
of 11 limited partners), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); cf Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (dictum in face to face transaction of closely held 
corporation shares); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.) 
("Restitution and damages equivalent to restitution are inappropriate remedies in this action. 
Traditionally these theories have been concerned with direct-personal dealings in which there 
is privity and/or unjust emichment upon which to justify the remedy." (citing, inter alia, 
Janigan) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 
718, 726, 747-49 (8th Cir. 1967) (close corporation; Janigan measure is one jury could 
award), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). 
79 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). 
80 Id. at 786; cf Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 824 F.2d 249,255 (3d Cir. 
1987) ("Where there is a possibility that one or the other party in a securities action will 
receive a windfall, the victim is favored over the violator." (citing Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 
491 F.2d 402,415 (3d Cir. 1974), which in tum quotes Janigan. 
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986), first quoted Ute and then quoted 
Janigan to explain the rationale for forcing the defendant to disgorge his or her profits. 
81 See Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d l332, l339 (9th Cir.) ("To allow violators of the Act to 
profit by their misconduct would undermine the deterrence that the Act was intended to 
effect."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). 
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that the defendant acquired the stock by fraud. 82 
The same judge who wrote Janigan later authored the en banc First 
Circuit opinion of SEC v. MacDonald,83 involving a defendant guilty of stock 
market insider trading. 84 In dictum, MacDonald stated that Janigan does not 
apply to publicly traded securities.85 (Citing, inter alia, Mitchell, MacDonald 
in dictum apparently endorsed the cover measure when a plaintiff buys or sells 
a publicly traded security.86 After the plaintiff has the reasonable opportunity 
to reverse the transaction, she should do so and thus protect herself from 
further damage. If she does not, she should suffer the consequences. 87) 
Because the disgorgement of windfall profits measure seems confined 
to the close corporation situation,88 the measure would not apply to stock 
market insider trading. 
G. Benefit of the Bargain 
The courts also sometimes employ the benefit of the bargain measure 
III section 1 O(b) cases.89 This measure is the difference between what the 
82 See Kaufman, supra note 50, at 43. 
The Second Circuit has stated that disgorgement of windfall profits is sometimes 
available to a defrauded buyer if the defendant's profits from selling can be traced with 
sufficient certainty. See Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-03 & n.10 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973). Other circuits have agreed with Zeller. See Pidcock 
v. Sunnyland Am., Inc., 854 F.2d 443,447 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Ohio Drill & Tool 
Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 191 (6th Cir. 1974); cf Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & 
Assocs., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1265 (4th Cir.) (quoting Zeller in dictum with apparent 
approval), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). 
83 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc). 
84 See id. at 48. 
85 See id. at 53 (dictum). 
86 See id. at 53-54. For discussion of the cover measure and MacDonald's endorsement of the 
cover measure in dictum, see supra Part I.D. 
87 See MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. 
88 See supra notes 78, 85 and accompanying text. 
89 See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing, but 
not deciding, whether benefit of bargain damages are available under Rule 10b-5; noting: "a 
number of circuit courts have recently concluded that, in certain limited circumstances, 
benefit of the bargain damages may be had under sections 1O(b) and 28(a)."); McMahan & 
Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing 
debenture purchasers to proceed in their suit for benefit of bargain damages under Exchange 
Act § 1 O(b) based on allegedly misleading statements in registration statement and allegedly 
misleading accompanying oral statements; plaintiffs were allegedly misinformed about true 
nature of their right to tender their debentures to Wherehouse upon certain triggering events; 
court did not decide whether plaintiffs could establish benefit of the bargain damages with 
requisite degree of certainty); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 
1971); Burch, supra note 23, at 365; see also Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc. 863 F.2d 
1550,1558 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[A] court may award 'benefit of the bargain' damages under 
Rule 1Ob-5 when the circumstances require it." (footnote omitted; dictum)); Norte & Co. v. 
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plaintiff actually received and what she expected she would receive had the 
defendant's representations been true.90 Unlike the out of pocket measure, 
which focuses on the plaintiffs actual 10SS,91 the benefit of the bargain 
measure focuses on the potential gain had the misrepresentation been true. 92 
Due to its arguably speculative nature, the benefit of the bargain measure is 
applied by the courts less often than the out of pocket measure.93 The courts 
generally limit the measure's application to unusual circumstances such as 
certain tender offer misrepresentations94 and cases in which such damages can 
be assessed with "reasonable certainty.,,95 
Huffmes, 288 F. Supp. 855, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (shareholder derivative suit), modified, 416 
F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); cf Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 
107, 111-15 (2d Cir. 1981) (action for violations of §§ 14(a) and 14(e) of Exchange Act; 
distinguishing Levine v. Seilon, Inc. 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971)). But see Gurary v. 
Winehouse, 235 F.3d 792, 799 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting benefit of bargain measure in dictum; 
quoting language in Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328,334 (2d Cir. 1971), that was labeled 
as dictum in both McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1049 
(2d Cir. 1995), and Osofsky v. Zip/, 645 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1985)). See generally Himes, 
supra note 25, at 84-85 (discussing benefit of the bargain measure); Younger, supra note 15, 
at 21-22 (discussing benefit of bargain measure). For a discussion of both McMahan and other 
cases either rejecting or adopting benefit of the bargain damages, see Edward Brodsky, 
Benefit of the Bargain Damages, N.Y.L.J., March 12, 1997, at 3, col. 1. For a discussion of 
McMahan, Osofsky, and other cases adopting benefit of the bargain damages, see Carroll E. 
Neesemann, Benefit-of-the-Bargain and Lost Profit Damages in Securities Litigation, 30 REv. 
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 89, 90-94 (1997). For discussion of McMahan, see Lowenfels & 
Bromberg, supra note 15, at 1096-98. 
90 See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Cunha v. 
Ward Foods, Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
91 For discussion of the out of pocket measure, see supra Parts LA., LB. 
92 For discussion of the difference between the benefit of the bargain and out of pocket 
measures, see Ronald B. Lee, Comment, The Measure of Damages Under Section IO(b) and 
Rule IOb-5, 46 MD. L. REv. 1266, 1274 (1987). 
93 See Neesemann, supra note 89, at 90. 
94 See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) ("We believe that the benefit-of-the-
bargain rule should be applied under the 1934 Act to the limited situation involved in this 
case, where misrepresentation is made in the tender offer and proxy solicitation materials as to 
the consideration to be forthcoming upon an intended merger."). See also 5E ARNOLD S. 
JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 20:10, at 20-66 to 20-
67 (2008) (stating that some Rule lOb-5 opinions hold that benefit of bargain theory is never 
appropriate but listing seven situations in which courts have awarded such damages, including 
misrepresentations in tender offer); cf McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't Inc., 65 F.3d 
1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We held that benefit-of-the-bargain damages, under Rule 10b-5, 
were particularly appropriate in the context of tender offers." (citing Osofsky). 
95 See McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1995) 
("[T]he key to awarding benefit-of-the-bargain damages is the degree of certainty to which 
they can be established." Id. at 1049 (citing Osofsky); court did not decide whether plaintiffs 
could establish benefit of the bargain damages with requisite degree of certainty); 
Commercial Union Assurance Co. plc v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608,614 (2d Cir.) ("Benefit-of-the-
bargain damages in a Rule 10b-5 action are not available unless they can be calculated with 
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Some courts have rejected this measure.96 One rationale is that such 
recovery would be contrary to Exchange Act section 28(a),97 which provides 
in pertinent part that "no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages 
under the provisions of this title shall recover ... a total amount in excess of 
his actual damages on account of the act complained of.,,98 
Stock market insider trading typically involves no misrepresentation.99 
For this reason, among others, benefit of the bargain damages would not be 
appropriate in an insider trading case. 
reasonable certainty."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994); Barrows v. Forest Labs, Inc., 742 
F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1984); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) ("But, 
of course, giving the plaintiff benefit-of-the-bargain damages is appropriate only where they 
can be established with reasonable certainty." Id. at 114); Younger, supra note 15, at 21 ("The 
federal courts have generally rejected this measure of damages as highly speculative. But 
more recently this theory has been allowed as a basis for damages when a reasonable certainty 
test can be met." (footnote omitted». 
Preventing unjust enrichment may be another factor justifying use of the benefit of the 
bargain measure. See Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121-22 (lOth Cir. 1982) 
(affirming trial court's damages award, which defendant argued was improper "benefit of the 
bargain" measure; circuit court said trial court's measure could be justified either as out of 
pocket measure or as means of avoiding unjust enrichment of defendant); id. at 1122 
("Preventing unjust enrichment is a well-recognized exception to the rule limiting damages to 
out-of-pocket loss."). 
96 See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Rumfield Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1551-52 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citing other cases); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239-40 (7th Cir. 
1974); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) ("a defrauded buyer of 
securities is . . . not [entitled to] the difference between the value of what he got and what it 
was represented he would be getting"); Restitution, supra note 24, at 359-60; cf Barrows v. 
Forrest Lab., Inc., 742 F.2d 54,59-60 (2d Cir. 1984) (distinguishing Osofsky). 
97 See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Rumfield Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1551-52 (7th 
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he statutes limit victims to 'actual damage', which the courts routinely 
understand to mean 'out of pocket loss' .... 'Out of pocket' loss does not include lost 
profits." (citations omitted»; Neesemann, supra note 89, at 91; cf Estate Counseling Serv., 
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962) ("The 
Act permits recovery of 'his actual damages .... ' 'Actual damages,' ... is the 'out of pocket 
rule.' ... [L]iability does not include the expectant fruits of an unrealized speculation."). 
Contra Wherehouse, 65 F.3d at 1049; but cf Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 
(l986) ("[T]his court has never interpreted § 28(a) as imposing a rigid requirement that every 
recovery on an express or implied right of action under the 1934 Act must be limited to the 
net economic harm suffered by the plaintiff."). 
98 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2009). For additional discussion of § 28(a), see supra notes 16-22, 
76-77 and accompanying text. 
99 See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REv. 570, 575 (2008). But cf WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 1, §§ 3:3.1 n.28-35 and accompanying text (stating that block trades 
blur line between face-to-face and anonymous stock market transactions), 5:2.3 n.136-38 and 
accompanying text (same). For discussion of how the stock market functions, see id. §3:3 .1. 
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II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING A 
"FAIR" MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
This article has discussed various measures of the damages of a private 
plaintiff who sues a stock market insider trading defendant. The measures are: 
"pure" out of pocket, "expedient" out of pocket, rescissory, and cover. 
The "pure" out of pocket measure is the difference between the 
transaction price and the real or actual share value. Implicitly, this measure 
assumes that but-for the defendant's fraud, the plaintiff would have traded at 
the same time anyway, but at a better price. 
The so-called "expedient" out of pocket measure accepts the "pure" 
out of pocket measure in principle. Nevertheless, to avoid the practical 
difficulty of determining the real value of the stock at the time of the 
plaintiffs trade, the "expedient" out of pocket measure substitutes for this 
"true value" the market price after dissemination of the correct or previously 
nonpublic information. A variant of the "expedient" out of pocket measure 
looks to either the dollar or percentage price change at curative dissemination 
and use this change as a measure of the damages to the plaintiff. The price 
change at dissemination could be applied to the plaintiffs transaction price to 
estimate the true value at the time of the plaintiffs trade. To correct for the 
effects of extraneous factors, more complex variations exist. 
The rescissory measure attempts to undo the fraudulent transaction and 
return the defrauded party to her position before the fraudulent inducement to 
enter into the trade. In other words, rescissory damages award a plaintiff the 
dollar amount at the time of judgment necessary to put her back in her original 
position prior to the fraudulent transaction. This measure implicitly assumes 
that the plaintiff would not have traded but-for the defendant's fraud. 
For the rescissory measure, courts usually require the plaintiff to prove 
a contractual relationship with the defendant. Most stock market insider 
trading plaintiffs are not in contractual privity with the defendant. The 
rescissory measure would give such plaintiffs an unjustified "free ride" to gain 
speculative profits from stock price changes until the date of judgment 
without risking any money. Conceivably, however, rescissory damages might 
be available to a plaintiff in contractual privity with an insider trading 
defendant, especially one liable under the classical relationship theory. 
Like the rescissory measure, the cover measure implicitly presumes 
that the plaintiff would not have traded but-for the defendant's fraud. This 
approach also implicitly assumes that the plaintiff is entitled to a rescissory 
measure of damages. Nevertheless, the cover measure imposes on the plaintiff 
the obligation to mitigate damages by reversing her trade within a 
"reasonable" time after curative disclosure. 
Although this article briefly discussed two additional damage 
measures, "disgorgement of windfall profits" and "benefit of the bargain," 
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these two measures are not appropriate in stock market insider trading cases. 
To select a "fair" measure of damages, one must know what the 
plaintiff would have done absent the defendant's fraud. When the plaintiff 
bought or sold a publicly traded security, she had an almost infinite number of 
alternatives. The plaintiff might have traded at some later time or not at all. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff might have traded at the same time but at a 
different price. 
If the plaintiff would have traded at the same time anyway, but at a 
different price, the "pure" out of pocket or "expedient" out of pocket measures 
would be appropriate. If the plaintiff would not have traded and would have 
maintained that position until the time of judgment, the rescissory measure 
might be proper; but fairness might require the plaintiff to mitigate damages, 
in which case the cover measure would be appropriate. 
The problem is determining what the plaintiff would have done absent 
the fraud. Any plaintiff testimony may be self-serving. The plaintiff may 
choose the alternative that maximizes recovery. For example, if the stock 
price has steadily increased since the plaintiff sold, the plaintiff may claim 
that she would have held until the time of judgment. 
With a class action, each plaintiff is not even available to give self-
serving testimony. Furthermore, the plaintiffs are not uniform and would have 
pursued different courses of action absent the fraud. Some would not have 
traded at all; others would have traded at different times. Therefore, no one 
measure of damages is "fair." 

